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NOTE 
INTERSTATE BURDENS AND 
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: A RE-




The Sherman Act has been described as the “Magna Carta” of the 
American economic system.1 Since 1890, it has been used to punish 
individuals and corporations that engage in unreasonable restraints of 
trade.2 The Act has been described as the Bill of Rights for American 
economic liberties.3 And as the Constitution sought to build a Union of 
States, the Sherman Act should seek to build a unified national 
economy. Although the Sherman Act has been successful in policing 
the U.S. economy, it has not been without its critics.4 Specifically, the per 
se immunity for certain state-created monopolies has been widely 
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1.  United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
2.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (scrutinizing certain price restrictions under rule of reason analysis). 
3.  City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(“[A]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms.”); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978) (“Simply put, 
the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has been construed 
to have a ‘generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional 
provisions.’”). 
4.  See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action
Task Force (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/report-state-action-
task-force-recommendations-clarify-and-reaffirm-original-purposes-state-
action/stateactionreport_0.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Report]. I will refer to the doctrine as 
“state action immunity” and “Parker immunity,” as the Court has. 
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criticized.5 Despite the criticism, the doctrine has remained largely 
unchanged since its inception in Parker v. Brown nearly eighty years 
ago.6 One of the Parker doctrine’s most common critiques is its failure 
to consider the interstate burdens state-implemented restraints can 
create.7 Although the U.S. federal system must permit states to regulate 
within a wide berth, state-created restraints erect the same barriers that 
the Sherman Act sought to eliminate.8 
Despite the Parker doctrine’s faults, it still serves a valuable 
purpose in respecting the federal balance, and it “embod[ies] in the 
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a 
significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.”9 Even 
though the Court has declined to revisit the doctrine, the development 
of the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence and its new 
understanding of federalism require a revision of the Parker doctrine.10 
Specifically, courts should balance the interstate effects and 
potential for collective action problems with the state’s interest in the 
regulation. Although states should have the authority to regulate 
conduct inside their boundaries, this authority should not be extended 
to create economic conditions that burden neighbor states or the nation 
as a whole. Once the federalism motivations behind the Parker doctrine 
disappear, all that is left is a restraint on trade. A state wishing to create 
interstate friction and promote economic insularism should not receive 
immunity to do so. 
Part I will first outline the doctrine, from its beginnings in Parker v. 
Brown to its modern doctrinal framework. Part II will then discuss the 
rationale behind the doctrine, ranging from Congress’s understanding 
of the Commerce Clause and federalism in 1890 to the modern 
justifications. The state’s role in regulation plays a large part in why the 
doctrine survives, because holding a state liable for all of its regulation, 
as the Sherman Act would otherwise require, would effectively destroy 
the state’s power to regulate altogether.11 Part III will expound 
critiques of the doctrine. Scholars have long voiced concerns about the 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  317 U.S. 341 (1943).  
 7.  Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 40–44. 
 8.  See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (assuming that the raisin prorate program at issue would be 
illegal if done by private parties). 
 9.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 503 (2015). 
 10.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (stating 
that developments in economic conditions counsel an evolving view of the Sherman Act). 
 11.  Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978). 
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doctrine and whether it comports with the principles of federalism. 
Furthermore, Part IV will propose solutions, along with their respective 
costs and benefits. Namely, this paper will argue that the best solution 
is to allow the Sherman Act to preempt state action when state action 
creates excessive interstate conflict. It is a constitutional goal to 
promote harmony among the states, minimize interstate burdens, and 
discourage isolationism and favoritism.12 The Constitution strives to 
create a more perfect political union, and in that same spirit the 
Sherman Act should strive to create a more perfect economic union as 
well.13 
I.  DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
A.  General Overview 
The Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade, 
whether by a single individual or a combination of competitors.14 
Analysis of possible Sherman Act violations typically proceeds on a 
case-by-case basis, employing the “rule of reason” to determine 
whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable or if it has sufficient pro-
competitive effects to be ruled valid.15 All restraints on trade fall under 
the purview of the Sherman Act, as long as the restraint affects 
interstate commerce and does not otherwise qualify for immunity.16 
The Sherman Act’s scope has broadened greatly since its passage in 
1890. In 1890, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause was 
interpreted narrowly.17 Just two years prior to the passing of the 
Sherman Act, the Court held in Kidd v. Pearson that even though a 
manufacturer’s output was eventually sold in several other states, he 
was not involved in interstate commerce.18 The Court explicitly 
constrained the reach of the Sherman Act in United States v. E.C. Knight 
 
 12.  United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council 
of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984). 
 13.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015) 
(describing federal antitrust law as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our 
free enterprise system). 
 14.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]his Court has long recognized that 
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”). 
 15.  See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1972). 
 16.  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980); see, 
e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (1976) (granting federal antitrust immunity 
for the “business of insurance”) (repealed 2021). 
 17.  Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888). 
 18.  Id. at 22–23 (1888). 
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Co.19 In E.C. Knight, the American Sugar Refining Company had 
sought to acquire a number of sugar manufacturing plants, granting it 
near complete control of the United States sugar market.20 However, 
the Court held that manufacturing sugar was not interstate commerce, 
as the Court drew a formal line between the “manufactur[ing]” of a 
good and the “disposition” of that same good.21 This distinction would 
not last. 
The Court ended that distinction in Wickard v. Filburn.22 The 
appellee owned a small farm in Ohio, part of which was a small acreage 
of wheat.23 He objected to penalties imposed by a federal wheat quota, 
arguing that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate his entire wheat crop because a portion of his wheat did not 
enter interstate commerce.24 However, the Court held that the 
Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to regulate any activity, 
the aggregate of which exerts a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.25 The Court cast away old formalist distinctions between 
“direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce, and instead 
adopted a functionalist approach that expanded Congress’s regulatory 
authority.26 
Wickard v. Filburn’s expansion of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause extended to the Sherman Act as well.27  As it 
pertained to the Sherman Act, “[t]he artificial and mechanical 
separation of ‘production’ and ‘manufacturing’ from ‘commerce,’ 
without regard to their economic continuity, . . . no longer suffice[d] to 
put either production or manufacturing and refining processes beyond 
reach of Congress’ authority or of the statute.”28 
The substance of the Sherman Act has changed over time as well. 
Even Justice Scalia, well-known for his formalist, textualist reading of 
statutes, understood that the Sherman Act not only invoked the 
common law term “restraint of trade” as it was understood in 1890, but 
the common law itself.29 Federal courts handling antitrust issues behave 
 
 19.  156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 20.  Id. at 9. 
 21.  Id. at 12. 
 22.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 23.  Id.at 114. 
 24.  Id. at 113–14.  
 25.  Id. at 127–28. 
 26.  Id. at 125–26. 
 27.  Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229 (1948). 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
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more like common-law courts than most other areas governed by 
federal statutes.30 The term “restraint[s] of trade” evolves as courts 
adapt to modern understanding and greater experience, and as the 
nature of economic conditions change.31 The main method of 
interpretation under the Sherman Act, the rule of reason, shirks formal 
categorization of certain types of conduct and instead proceeds on a 
case-by-case basis, examining whether the conduct at issue is 
unreasonably anti-competitive.32 This functional analysis further 
confirms the adaptability of the Sherman Act: Instead of being bound 
by formalist categories, the court may assess the conduct at hand and 
analyze its anti-competitive effects within the greater context of the 
national economy.33 This formulation allows the Sherman Act to 
change as economic conditions change, and, as new problems arise, 
courts are empowered to interpret the Sherman Act to adapt to new 
problems.34 
B.  Genesis of the State Immunity Doctrine: Parker v. Brown 
The state action immunity doctrine, which insulates states from 
liability under the Sherman Act, began with Parker v. Brown.35 In 1940, 
California enacted a program restricting the amount of raisins that each 
producer could sell on the open market, seeking to “conserve the 
agricultural wealth of the state.”36 Under the program, producers were 
required to give their entire crop to the state, who would then classify 
and store seventy percent of the raisins, allowing farmers to only sell 
thirty percent of the crop they intended to market.37 The Court 
assumed for the sake of argument that this arrangement would violate 
the Sherman Act if undertaken by private businesses.38 Appellee, a 
raisin farmer, challenged the validity of the program under both the 
Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause. 
The Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to California’s 
 
 30.  Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981). 
 31.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). 
 32.  See id. at 885–86. 
 33.  Id. at 899–900. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
 36.  Id. at 346. 
 37.  Id. at 348. 
 38.  Id. at 350 (“We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program 
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a 
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate.”). 
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prorate program for raisin production.39 The arrangement never 
operated by force of individual agreement or combination of 
agreements, but was specifically enacted by the state legislature.40 The 
Court noted that nothing in the Sherman Act’s text suggested that its 
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers from acting under 
legislative directive.41 Further, the legislative history of the bill showed 
that it was never intended to reach state-created restraints of trade. The 
Sherman Act’s sponsor declared that it would only prevent “business 
combinations.”42 In fact, the legislative history bears no mention of 
state action; rather, legislators were focused solely on private conduct.43 
Beyond Parker’s statutory holding, important concerns about 
federalism also underlaid the Court’s decision to insulate state action 
from antitrust scrutiny. State regulation often restricts trade to achieve 
a public goal. For example, cities may use restrictive zoning, or a state 
may have mandatory licensing laws that could reasonably qualify as 
restraints of trade.44 Federal antitrust law broadly prohibits such 
conduct among private actors,45 and although federal law is supreme 
over state law, the Sherman Act never meant to displace the state’s 
sovereign power to regulate within its borders.46 
States are presumed competent to regulate local conduct, but in the 
wake of Wickard v. Filburn, the scope of both Congress’s commerce 
clause and Sherman Act powers expanded.47 Faced with the prospect 
that numerous state regulations could come within the ambit of the 
Sherman Act, the Court in Parker was tasked with how to confront 
 
 39.  Id. at 352. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 350–51. 
 42.  Id. at 341 (citing 19 Cong. Rec. 6041). 
 43.  Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (1943). 
 44.  City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Parker, 341 U.S. at 351–52. The Court also went on to hold that the prorate program did 
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause for two reasons: First, the legislation, which intended 
to stabilize the price of raisins, was a matter of both state and national concern. But because 
Congress had not acted, it was a solution “peculiarly within the province of the state.” Id. at 367. 
The program did not target, nor did it discriminate against, interstate commerce. Rather, the state 
merely raised prices and lowered quantities, which impacted interstate commerce only 
incidentally. And second, Congress’s implementation of other marketing regulations similar to 
the California prorate program demonstrated that Congress had implicitly accepted California’s 
regime. Id. at 367–68.  
 47.  See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976) (“[D]ecisions by 
this Court have permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with expanding notions 
of congressional power.”). 
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them. The Court first noted that states are sovereign in the American 
dual system of federalism, unless the constitution or Congress strips 
that power away.48 So because the Sherman Act did not explicitly take 
away states’ power to regulate in effectively anti-competitive ways, the 
Sherman Act simply could not apply to state conduct.49 The underlying 
federalism motivation has continued to develop, and the Court 
continues to emphasize that federalism is an important part of the 
Parker doctrine.50 
C. Modern State Immunity Doctrine 
The Court has since developed a more thorough doctrine consistent 
with Parker’s original holding. Under the current doctrine, in order to 
be entitled to state action immunity, the challenged restraint must first 
be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy”; 
second, the policy must be “actively supervised” by the State itself.51 If 
the restraint is managed by a municipality instead of a private party, 
only the “clear policy” prong must be satisfied.52 
A clearly articulated state policy helps courts to ensure the state is 
not merely rubber-stamping a private restraint on trade.53 For example, 
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, a state bar instituting a minimum fee 
schedule without any guidance from the Virginia Legislature or the 
Virginia Supreme Court was not a “clearly articulated state policy.”54 
Nor was Michigan taking a “neutral” stance towards a lamp exchange 
program sufficient for antitrust immunity in Cantor v. Detroit Edison 
Co.55 The nature of the regulation also matters. Activities related to the 
“core of the State’s power to protect the public” are more likely to be 
 
 48.  Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 503 
(2015) (re-affirming federalism as an essential factor to the existence of the Parker doctrine); Cal. 
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1980) (same); see 
also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (1978) (same). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). The Court did not require 
clear articulation because “[o]nce it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to 
require the State to supervise actively the municipality’s execution of what is a properly delegated 
function.” Id. Because cities only exist under the sovereign authority of the state, it is presumed 
they act in the public interest and do not need to be supervised. Id. 
 53.  Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 118–19 (2006) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 
(1977)). 
 54.  421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975). 
 55.  428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976). 
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entitled to immunity, whereas Cantor’s restraint was merely regulating 
the additional services an electric company could offer, which is not a 
primary government function.56 
Additionally, the Court requires “active supervision” of the 
regulation by a state to ensure that the restraint is still part of a state’s 
sovereign authority.57 If the state is merely shielding private conduct 
from the purview of antitrust law, the restraint is not entitled to 
immunity.58 It is further assumed that, without the requisite supervision, 
there is “no realistic assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive 
conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual 
interests.”59 
These requirements developed as a way to distinguish between a 
state managing an anti-competitive restraint and a state effectively 
authorizing private actors to violate the Sherman Act. This distinction 
helps ensure that anti-competitive conduct comes from a state directive 
in the public interest—not simply a private actor using the power of the 
state to become a monopoly.60 Unless the state actively observes, 
reviews or re-examines the program, the state cloaks otherwise 
unlawful, private restraints of trade as state action, immunizing such 
restraints from challenge.61 Such a thinly veiled distinction cannot be 
justified under the law.62 
III.  DOCTRINAL CRITICISM 
Although the Court has continued to re-affirm Parker v. Brown’s 
central holding, many have criticized the Parker doctrine. Both scholars 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have highlighted problems 
with the doctrine and offered a number of solutions for how to remedy 
its faults.63 
The first common critique of the doctrine is that it does not account 
for out-of-state economic effects. Unless a regulation runs afoul of 
another constitutional barrier, no consideration of interstate spillovers 
 
 56.  Hettich, supra note 53, at 119. 
 57.  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
 58.  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 505 (2015). 
 59.  Patrick v. Burget, 498 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988). 
 60.  See Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105–06. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 105.  
 63.  See generally Task Force Report, supra note 4 (describing a number of academic 
criticisms of the Parker doctrine). 
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applies.64 One need not look farther than Parker itself to see how the 
state action doctrine can impose costs on out-of-state residents, even 
though those residents have diminished political capital in the state. At 
the time Parker was decided, between 90 and 95 percent of raisins 
produced in California entered interstate commerce and California 
provided almost all of the nation’s raisins.65 Most American raisin 
consumers lived outside of California and had no political means to 
oppose the state’s legislative program, yet they bore the costs of 
California’s state-sanctioned monopoly.66 
Second, similar concerns about political representation animate 
critiques of Parker immunity. The policy at issue in Parker restricted 
output and artificially raised prices, two results federal antitrust law 
generally seeks to prohibit.67 Although the benefits of such a program 
were borne almost exclusively by California, the costs of the program 
were incurred by raisin consumers across the nation.68 The political 
incentives to promote such a program follow closely with economic 
costs and benefits.69 California raisin producers have a strong incentive 
to lobby their own government to install such a program, but it would 
be nearly impossible for non-California residents to challenge such a 
policy through the normal political channels.70 The government of 
California is not the appropriate body to properly weigh the benefits 
to in-state raisin producers with the costs to out-of-state consumers, yet 
the Parker doctrine grants California per se immunity on federalism 
grounds.71 Although the California program was implicitly endorsed by 
Congress, one is just as likely to find similar programs with no similar 
 
 64.  See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984) (holding activity by a legislature or 
state supreme court is per se immune from antitrust scrutiny with no analysis of out-of-state 
effects). 
 65.  Parker, 317 U.S. at 345.  
 66.  See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An 
Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2188 (2015) (describing the harms of 
the prorate program at issue). 
 67.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he antitrust laws 
are aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price fixing, which gouge the consumer.”). 
 68.  See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345 (describing how most raisins were shipped into interstate 
commerce). 
 69.  Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1235–38 (1997) [hereinafter Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism]; see also 
Daniel A. Farber Philip, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 890–901 (1987) 
(describing an economic approach to public choice theory). 
 70.  John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
713, 724 (1986) (describing the free rider problem). 
 71.  Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (1943). 
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implicit endorsement.72 
The U.S. Constitution embodies a system of federalism where the 
federal government is sovereign in some respects, and the several states 
are sovereign in others.73 This system of  federalism gives states the 
power to regulate local matters and the federal government the power 
to regulate issues that states are less suited to regulate.74 When costs 
spill over into other states, the national government becomes the 
appropriate body to regulate the costs and benefits of such a program.75 
The Court has recognized such spillover effects, and how political 
actors, even government entities, can act solely in self-interest.76 Such 
state self-interest can directly harm consumers outside of its territorial 
jurisdiction.77 
Parker immunity, as it stands, runs counter to longstanding ideals of 
national unity that harken back to the Founding era. The law has long 
prohibited states from imposing excessive costs on the nation as a 
whole, solely for the purpose of furthering its own intrastate policy 
interests. McCulloch v. Maryland illustrates the Court’s wariness of self-
serving state action.78 In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall held that 
states may not tax the national bank, as they would be wielding power 
against the whole of the United States, even though the whole of the 
United States is not represented by each state.79 Similar to a state tax 
being problematic since it is the part acting on the whole, anti-
competitive restraints by the states would unduly impose costs on the 
nation. The people of the United States, acting through Congress, 
christened competition and free markets through the Sherman Act.80 
 
 72.  See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102–03 
(1980) (describing how Congress repealed legislation granting immunity to the conduct at issue). 
 73.  Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792, 
1794–95 (2019) (describing American dual federalism). 
 74.  Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (applying this idea to the treaty power). 
 75.  See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory 
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 138 (2010) (describing how interstate externalities 
should be handled by federal governments). 
 76. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (“Moreover, a municipality conceivably might charge discriminatorily higher rates to 
such captive customers outside its jurisdiction without a cost-justified basis. Both of these 
practices would provide maximum benefits for its constituents, while disserving the interests of 
the affected customers.”). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[T]he Sherman Act was designed 
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade.”). 
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Just as one state could not tax the resources of the United States, one 
state should not be allowed to use state policy to burden the national 
economy. Because the potential costs to state-created monopolies are 
so high,81 federal policy should prohibit states from allocating those 
costs beyond their borders. Any state that wishes to impose monopoly 
costs outside of its borders to benefit itself and undermine competition 
should be carefully scrutinized when it does so. This scrutiny would not 
be fatal-in-fact for the legislation, but it should be enough for states to 
second-guess an attempt to enrich itself to the detriment of its sister 
states. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The Sherman Act, and specifically Parker immunity, should be 
interpreted in light of the above concerns. After all, the Sherman Act is 
the standard-bearer for the U.S. free market system, and so our 
interpretation of it should evolve with our understanding of 
constitutional principles and economic conditions.82 Justice Burger’s 
concurrence in City of Lafayette elaborates on this point: 
Our conceptions of the limits imposed by federalism are bound to 
evolve, just as our understanding of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause has evolved. Consequently, since we find it 
appropriate to allow the ambit of the Sherman Act to expand with 
evolving perceptions of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause, a similar process should occur with respect to “state action” 
analysis under Parker. That is, we should not treat the result in the 
Parker case as cast in bronze; rather, the scope of the Sherman Act’s 
power should parallel the developing concepts of American 
federalism.83 
As states impose costs on each other through state-sanctioned 
monopolies, the Court’s understanding of federalism and the 
Commerce Clause counsels scrutiny of the Parker doctrine. An entirely 
new doctrine is not necessary to curtail Parker immunity. Rather, the 
issue can be resolved by applying Parker immunity in light of the 
American dual system of federalism and the Commerce Clause. 
Modern scholarship critiques the lack of concern for interstate 
spillovers. By that token, the modern Parker doctrine fails to account 
for economic efficiency and undermines political representation values 
 
 81.  Meese, supra note 66, at 2188. 
 82.  United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 83.  435 U.S. 389, 421 n.2 (Burger, J. concurring). 
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meant to be protected by federalism.84 So while scholars almost 
universally recognize that interstate economic spillovers are 
problematic, there is no consensus on what remedy is most appropriate. 
A.  Substantive Review of State Regulations 
The first of these solutions is to add substantive review of state 
regulations. The current doctrine requires only procedural clearance 
before a court will grant state action immunity.85 Courts do not inquire 
if the regulation is substantively reasonable, nor do courts apply any 
“rule of reason” analysis present in most other antitrust cases. Justice 
Blackmun proposed a test that would insert a substantive barrier to 
claims of immunity: State-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must be 
declared void if its potential harms outweigh its benefits.86 His test is a 
modified rule of reason analysis. It assesses the justifications for 
anticompetitive activity in the same way courts assess justifications in 
equal protection cases: where “justifications are at all substantial,” then 
a court should not find the restraint unreasonable.87 
Justice Blackmun applied his test to the regulation in Cantor. The 
anticompetitive practice at issue was an alleged tie of electricity service 
and lightbulbs offered by the Detroit Edison Company.88 In this case, 
the allege tie was providing, at no cost, new residential customers with 
lightbulbs and replacing burned-out bulbs. Detroit Edison’s rates, both 
for electricity and the omission of any charge for lightbulbs, had to be 
approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission and could not 
be changed without the Commission’s approval.89  Detroit Edison 
claimed that they had received no profit from the distribution of bulbs, 
and stated the intended purpose was to increase the consumption of 
electricity.90 On the other hand, the petitioner, a retail druggist selling 
light bulbs, claimed that the policy’s real purpose was to foreclose a 
substantial portion of the lightbulb market.91 Because the Court only 
addressed the applicability of Parker, the Court did not address the 
 
 84.  Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 44. 
 85.  See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 495 (2015) 
(describing the current test). 
 86.  Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610 (1976). 
 87.  Id. at 611. 
 88.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Tying the Sale of Two Products, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/tying-sale-two-products 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (describing antitrust ties). 
 89.  Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582–83. 
 90.  Id. at 583–84. 
 91.  Id. at 584. 
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merits of the underlying antirust claim.92 Nevertheless, in his 
concurrence, Justice Blackmun applied a substantive rule of reason 
analysis and found the tie to be unreasonably anti-competitive and thus 
not entitled to immunity.93 He stated that while the tie originated as a 
way to allow people to use more electricity, there were other less 
restrictive means to achieve that same result, like a promotional 
lightbulb sale.94 Michigan’s interest in the tie—having lightbulbs being 
sold by a regulated producer—was rejected as an inadequate state 
objective because no evidence suggested that a competitive lightbulb 
market created instability or raised any other traditional concerns with 
competitive markets.95 In short, Justice Blackmun’s proposed test is 
slightly stricter than rational basis review.96 
Justice Blackmun’s test offers a number of benefits that the current 
Parker doctrine does not account for. First, it would require states to 
articulate the intent behind the regulation that abrogates the free-
market scheme. In Cantor, Justice Blackmun took note of the lack of 
evidence that the Michigan Public Service Commission had even 
considered the light-bulb tie that it had endorsed for the private Detroit 
Edison Company to use.97 A state enacting an anti-competitive 
regulation or scheme should be incentivized to develop a rich 
legislative history in order to properly defend their scheme in court. In 
other words, they should have to show that deliberative process led to 
the challenged policy. This, in turn, would incline regulators to more 
critically review regulations before they are enacted.98 Second, it would 
allow courts to stay well within their wheelhouse of antitrust law: 
applying the rule of reason. Justice Blackmun’s test is consistent with 
the common practice of federal courts in antitrust cases, and the more 
specific problem of assessing state interests against federal dictates, also 
familiar to federal courts.99 Such a test would allow most legitimate 
state restraints to continue lawfully, and only those with significant 
competitive harms or no justification at all would be invalidated. 
While such a system would address some political concerns about 
the doctrine, it does not go far enough to solve federalism concerns 
 
 92.  Id. at 581–82. 
 93.  Id. at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 613. 
 96.  Id. at 611. 
 97.  Id. at 610.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 612. 
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inherent in the modern Parker doctrine. Justice Blackmun’s solution 
does not explicitly outline what justifications he would find sufficient 
to allow a program to succeed, nor does he explicitly mention what 
costs may doom a program. Further, it only connects the state interest 
in the regulation to its effectiveness in achieving that objective. Few 
courts have engaged in any meaningful analysis as to state policy goals 
underlying a restraint on trade, and no analysis goes specifically to the 
interstate effects of such a policy.100 However, creating a solution to 
address federalism does not involve re-inventing the wheel, as existing 
doctrines and proposals can be slightly altered to best police the 
doctrine. 
B.  Dormant Commerce Clause Fills the Gap 
Another proposed solution would leave the Parker doctrine 
unaltered but instead let the Dormant Commerce Clause handle state 
restraints that create spillovers. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
proceeds in two main ways. First, if a state regulation is facially 
discriminatory towards out-of-state commerce, or if it is not 
discriminatory on its face but still creates discriminatory effects, it is 
virtually per se invalid.101 Such regulations include mandating waste to 
be processed in certain in-state facilities,102 prohibiting the importation 
of out-of-state waste,103 and prohibiting the exportation of in-state 
minnows.104 Only if the regulation has a legitimate objective, and that 
objective cannot be achieved by non-discriminatory means, can the 
regulation survive.105 Such regulations are not typically challenged in 
Parker cases, but restraints on trade could fall into this category.106 
Second, if a regulation is nondiscriminatory and its effects on interstate 
commerce are incidental, the regulation is valid unless the “burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”107 This approach has been used to strike down 
a number of regulations, including Arizona fruit-labeling 
requirements,108 an Illinois statute requiring certain mudguards on 
 
 100.  Hettich, supra note 53, at 149. 
 101.  Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 102.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994). 
 103.  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
 104.  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 324–25 (1979). 
 105.  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (holding Maine’s restriction on out-of-state 
live baitfish valid because no workable alternatives existed to protect Maine’s fisheries). 
 106.  See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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trailer trucks,109 and an Iowa statute barring long trucks on their 
highways.110 However, this analysis has rather lenient results when state 
action merely “affects” interstate commerce but does not explicitly 
discriminate against it. 111 This lenient approach is not enough to 
appropriately police states that enact anti-competitive schemes that 
create interstate burdens. 
Academics have developed multiple different methods for 
determining how significant a spillover problem must be in order for 
the federal government to preempt otherwise valid state regulations. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, prominent Law and Econ Scholar,112 
proposed an extreme solution. He proposed that any state regulation 
would lose Parker immunity unless the residents of that state bear the 
entire monopoly overcharge.113 In his view, “states could have any rules 
they want, so long as he who calls the tune also pays the piper.”114 In 
other words, a state regulation should only be entitled to Parker 
immunity if the state can internalize all of the externalities generated 
by a monopoly-creating regulation. However, such approach would 
likely eliminate a significant portion of state regulation. Most notably, 
such an approach would render the regulations in Parker itself invalid, 
as nearly all of the raisins were shipping in interstate commerce.115 
Furthermore, that kind of restriction would overly burden certain 
industries that rely on exports consumed nationally. For example, a 
significant amount of agriculture crosses state lines.116 It cannot be the 
case that any restraint on agriculture production would be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. Imposing Easterbrook’s “any effect” 
standard would wipe out states’ regulatory authority—especially for 
agriculture. On the other hand, Easterbrook’s approach would bode 
well for certain local restrictions, such as power companies with limited 
territorial reach or specific regulations on intrastate trucking rates.117 
 
 109.  Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
 110.  Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 111.  See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943) (holding the prorate program merely 
affected interstate commerce). 
 112.  Frank H. Easterbrook, UNIV. CHI. L. SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).  
 113.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 
45 (1983). 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See, e.g., California Agricultural Exports, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2017-
18AgExports.pdf (stating that California’s agricultural exports totaled over $20 billion in 2017). 
 117.  Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50–52. 
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Some academics have proposed middle ground approaches. For 
example, Alan Meese proposed that the analysis should focus on 
whether the restraint truly affects interstate commerce and that 
Dormant Commerce Clause preemption should apply only to 
anticompetitive state statutes that result in significant spillovers.118 
Such a proposal would eliminate most of the tension between federal 
antitrust law and local regulation.119 However, such an approach fails 
to appreciate the state’s interest in regulation. While Meese’s proposal 
focuses on the spillover effects currently neglected by the Parker 
doctrine, it fails to give any weight to the state’s interest in regulating. 
C.  The Middle Ground: A Way Forward 
The test proposed here adopts a similar middle ground approach. It 
balances the states’ interest in regulation with federal interests in 
promoting competition and avoiding economic sectarianism. 
Restraints that impose unreasonable costs on out-of-state consumers 
should not be entitled to Parker antitrust immunity. Rather, courts 
should balance the interstate effects and potential for collective action 
problems with the state’s interest in the regulation.120 While a more 
formal demarcation of what is and is not permissible would be 
desirable, the realities of economics and markets, as well as our original 
understanding of the Sherman Act, do not allow for bright-line rules.121 
Instead, the Court should use the tools it has already developed in the 
antitrust realm to determine whether a state action is immune from 
antitrust enforcement. 
This proposed test assumes a fairly basic doctrinal framework. The 
plaintiff must first demonstrate the restraint has out-of-state effects. 
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated those effects, the burden then 
shifts to the state to show that its interest in regulating is sufficiently 
strong to overcome the burdens placed on out-of-state citizens. Courts 
should consider a number of factors, including any parallel federal 
regulations, the necessity and of a restraint, and if the restraint is in an 
area of traditional state competence. This is not an exhaustive list of 
considerations but rather a starting point. If a plaintiff successfully 
shows that a regulation imposes unreasonable costs on out-of-state 
 
 118.  Meese, supra note 66, at 2192. 
 119.  Id. at 2191. 
 120.  Such a test borrows from Justice Blackmun’s approach in Cantor and from the Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  
 121.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) 
(describing how enforcement of the Sherman Act evolves with changing economic times). 
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citizens, the federalism concerns that would normally endow the state 
with immunity are gone. All that is left is a restraint on trade, 
undeserving of protection on federalism grounds. 
States can offer a number of rationales to defend their legislation. 
These rationales might include economic analyses. But the test should 
not constitute a purely economic cost-benefit analysis. Courts are not 
to only consider economic benefits, but also respect for states as 
sovereigns. For example, similar to the balancing test in Pike, the court 
should consider the local benefits generated by state regulation.122 Pike 
itself concerned the labeling of cantaloupes.123 The Court recognized 
food labeling as an area of traditional state competence, as part of 
promoting public health and safety, and thus an extension of state 
sovereignty.124 
Both the existence of a state interest and the strength of that 
interest ought to factor into the interest-balancing calculus.125 If states 
are regulating in areas where they have a legitimate interest, they 
should be better insulated from antitrust scrutiny. However, if a state is 
regulating in such a way that imposes externalities on other states and 
does not serve a legitimate state interest, the state should not be 
shielded from antitrust scrutiny.126 On the other hand, if the restraint is 
the least restrictive means for achieving a state goal, or the restraint is 
particularly effective at achieving a goal, a greater showing of out-of-
state effects could be required to hold the restraint invalid.127 
Further, a state may argue that its legislation restraining trade 
serves the national interest. That national interest can be demonstrated 
by examples of federal cooperation with the program or parallel federal 
legislation. This consideration was present in Parker but has been 
largely ignored by the Court since.128 If, as was the case in Parker, a state 
restraint mirrors federal legislation in a particular area, then the federal 
goal of promoting competition is pre-empted by another federal goal, 
and the state restraint stands on stronger ground. Because California’s 
 
 122.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142–44 (1970). 
 123.  Id. at 138. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  If no legitimate state interest exists, as suggested in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U.S. 579, 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring), the balancing test will be rather simple, with the test 
likely finding the regulation invalid. 
 126.  Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977). 
 127.  See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980) 
(noting a retail price maintenance scheme for wine did not achieve either of the interests the state 
offered). 
 128.  317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943). 
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program in Parker was analogous to the federal agricultural price 
stability program, the federal pro-competitive policy embodied by the 
Sherman Act was superseded by another federal interest, and the 
state’s policy thus did not disturb that superseding federal goal. 
However, while parallel federal legislation would significantly 
bolster a state regulation’s position, it is not necessary to show parallel 
federal legislation to prevail. For instance, if the state restraint remedies 
a market failure or otherwise improves economic efficiency, the 
restraint stands on firmer ground. California was faced with a national 
problem in Parker but was nevertheless competent to solve the 
problem on its own.129 The federal government should not displace 
state legislation when the legislation properly solves a national issue. If 
the crux of a national issue, like fluctuating raisin prices, can be 
adequately solved by one state, there is no need for federal interference 
in the issue. Indeed, not all externalities are negative. 
On the other hand, a regulation’s out-of-state effects may weigh 
against the state. These can take the form of spillover costs, collective 
action problems, and other burdens on interstate commerce. States are, 
almost by definition, incompetent to solve collective action problems 
that extend beyond their borders. A state restraint is more vulnerable 
to invalidation the more it imposes burdens on other states. Such 
burdens and collective action are not unique to localized regulations, 
so this balancing test would largely serve to protect states’ interest in 
regulating local matters. For example, recent Court decisions 
concerning Parker involved peer-review proceedings at a single 
hospital,130 sewage treatment surrounding one city in one state,131 and 
cable TV regulations in one city.132 Each was local enough to stave off 
concerns of out-of-state effects. 
But the absence of an interstate collective action problem should 
not end the analysis. Simply because a market failure or some sort of 
interstate collective action problem does not exist does not mean the 
state regulation should automatically prevail. If the regulation’s 
negative interstate effects outweigh any local benefit, even if not in a 
“significant way,” the regulation still ought to lose antitrust immunity. 
However, this side of the test should not consider intrastate effects of a 
regulation, or a collective action problem that occurs within a single 
 
 129.  Parker, 317 U.S. at 367 (1943). 
 130.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 627 (1992). 
 131.  Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 36 (1985). 
 132.  Community Comm. Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
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state. These burdens are entrusted to a state’s political system. If a state 
decides to displace competition within its borders, and the effects do 
not cross state lines, it is up to the citizens to hold their representatives 
accountable if they disagree with that decision.133 
V.  DISCUSSION 
For a test case, consider California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., where state regulations set “an 
effective price schedule or effective fair-trade contract” for wine being 
sold in certain transaction areas.134 At the time, such resale price 
coordination (by private actors) was per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act.135 The Court rejected a Parker immunity defense because the state 
had not actively supervised the price maintenance.136 However, 
assuming a similar scenario where California does actively supervise 
the resale price maintenance, the policy is still unlikely to survive the 
proposed test. Applying this test, a Court would first note any out-of-
state effects the regulation has. While the specific scope of out-of-state 
effects were undetermined, there was no dispute that the California 
statute had at least some out-of-state effects. The Court would need to 
consider the specific facts of a case in order to properly balance the 
countervailing interests. The Court would also take into account the 
State’s interest in the regulation. In Midcal, the state offered 
“promoting temperance and orderly market conditions” as the relevant 
state interests.137 The first interest, temperance (or reducing people’s 
alcohol consumption), is not promoted by such a scheme.138  Further, 
the Supreme Court noted findings by the California Supreme Court 
that fair trade laws enjoyed little justification to continue.139 The state 
enacted the resale price maintenance scheme in order to protect small 
licensees from predatory pricing policies of large retailers.140 However, 
 
 133.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) (“[S]tates must 
accept political responsibility for the actions they intend to undertake.”). 
 134.  445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980). 
 135.  Id. at 102–03; but see Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
899 (2007) (holding resale price maintenance schemes no longer per se illegal). Resale price 
maintenance schemes involve resellers agreeing to sell a manufacturers’ product either above a 
price floor or below a price ceiling.  
 136.  Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105–06. 
 137.  Id. at 112. 
 138.  Id. (noting liquor consumption went up 42% while resale price maintenance was in 
effect). 
 139.  Id. at 113.  
 140.  Id. at 112–13. Predatory pricing schemes involve a company charging below some unit 
of cost, hoping to create an unsustainable market condition that causes other competitors to exit 
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the state interest itself was not advanced by such a scheme.141 
Additionally, no federal legislation paralleled the California 
scheme.142  This case would thus be an easy one for balancing concerns. 
The state has no legitimate, practical interest in maintaining the resale 
price maintenance scheme, and the federal interest in competition and 
burdens on out-of-state citizens outweigh the non-existent state 
interest. A more difficult case would arise where the wine pricing 
scheme actually did achieve state objectives. But if that were the case, 
the plaintiff would still have strong grounds to challenge the pricing 
scheme. For instance, they could first present less restrictive means to 
accomplish those goals, since the temperance movement in the United 
States is not short on methods to discourage alcohol consumption.143 
Moreover, “orderly market conditions” could possibly be achieved by 
a number of different strategies with less negative impact out-of-state. 
Under this proposed test, if a state restraint impermissibly imposes 
its costs on other states, it merely loses its Parker immunity. The statute 
would then be subject to general review under antitrust law. Although 
many of the restraints mentioned would likely violate general review 
in antitrust courts,144 states will still have an additional opportunity to 
defend their regulations under rule of reason analysis. Such cases are 
not likely to be successful for the state, however. Rule of reason analysis 
only covers competitive harms and benefits, not general social welfare 
benefits.145  Once a state statute is shown to impermissibly burden 
interstate commerce, it is likely going to be held invalid under any 
antitrust scrutiny. This is a feature of this test, not a bug. Once the 
federalism principles underlying Parker have been undermined or 
shown to be outweighed by the interest in national unity and 
competition, all that is left is a restraint on trade. It ceases to become a 
state regulation worthy of protection on federalism grounds and 
 
the market, where the company can then reap the benefits of a more concentrated market.  
 141.  See id. (describing findings of fact by the California Supreme Court that showed 
California’s scheme did not achieve its intended objective). 
 142.  See id. at 110–13 (offering no federal interest in the state regime). 
 143.  See Alice W. Campbell, Temperance Movement, VCU LIBRARIES SOC. WELFARE 
PROJECT (2017), https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/religious/the-temperance-movement/ 
(describing a number of ways temperance was promoted in the United States). 
 144.  See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (assuming that the raisin prorate 
program would be illegal if done by private parties). 
 145.  See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“In either 
event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the 
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in 
the interest of the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy 
decision has been made by the Congress”). 
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becomes a restraint subject to rule of reason review. 
Such review would not transform antitrust courts into Lochner era 
tribunals passing judgment on the wisdom of state restraints.146 The goal 
of a courts’ review of this proposed test would not be to ask, “is this 
statute economically efficient?” but rather “does this statute offend the 
principles of national unity and impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce?” Principles of national unity underpin a number of existing 
constitutional doctrines. This approach to the Parker doctrine, where 
state regulations that create significant collective action problems fall 
under antitrust scrutiny, best aligns with the constitutional ideal of 
interstate harmony. 
Outside of the antitrust sphere, constitutional doctrine exists in 
order to foster harmony within the union and between states. In fact, a 
number of state economic regulations inspired the creation of a 
national commerce clause.147 The cycle of states abusing their discretion 
to support their economic self-interest is as old as the Union itself. For 
example, while not a monopoly, New York’s independence in setting 
tariff rates that benefitted New York is one cited reason for a 
Constitution granting a strong commerce power in the federal 
government.148 The Constitution set up a national market to defeat 
economic provincialism.149 The Sherman Act, the free market charter 
for the United States, should do the same.150 While state regulation and 
sovereignty are crucial to a healthy system of federalism, the Court has 
not shied away from enforcing limits on state’s abilities to harass each 
other as co-equal sovereigns. By preventing state-action immunity from 
covering restraints that create excessive interstate conflicts, the 
Sherman Act can promote constitutional ideals and interstate harmony 
as well. 
The primary remedy to a violation of the proposed test should not 
be treble damages, but an injunction prohibiting the conduct from 
continuing. One of the hallmarks of antitrust enforcement is the 
 
 146.  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (describing the vices of the 
Lochner era). 
 147.  See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2089 (“[T]he Commerce Clause 
‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the 
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to 
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the 
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”). 
 148.  GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 260–64 (2017). 
 149.  Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 453 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 150.  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
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possibility of treble damages.151 However, while concerns with antitrust 
law mainly focus on harm to consumers and the competitive process, 
this paper’s concerns with the Parker doctrine involve constitutional 
issues of national unity and free markets. Because states should not be 
subject to the threat of treble damages for every statute they pass, the 
adequate remedy would be to prohibit the state from continuing to 
burden out-of-state citizens, not pay those citizens triple damages. A 
state legislating for the public good, which then burdens interstate 
commerce, invokes very different concerns than a group of competitors 
conspiring to fix prices. Where treble damages seek to punish profit-
maximizing individuals from benefiting from anti-competitive 
activities,152 the balancing test proposed above seeks to preserve the 
federal balance rather than demarcate and penalize states. Further, 
threatening public bodies with treble damages might deter states from 
passing legitimate local legislation for fears that the state would need 
to pay treble damages.153 
This revision of the Parker doctrine better aligns it with modern 
economic theory. As a general principle, the more a sovereign is able to 
internalize the benefits and costs of some regulation, the more efficient 
the economic regulation will be.154 While the current Parker doctrine 
does not consider the internalization principle at all, this proposed 
solution allows antitrust suits to correct interstate burdens that become 
too severe. Congress has already legislated and made its policies clear 
through the Sherman Act: namely, promoting free markets and 
competition.155 Thus, if a state restraint places burdens onto other states 
where the restraining state is not politically accountable, the body that 
can best internalize those costs, Congress, has decided to promote 
competition.156 The policy promoting competition would then overrule 
 
 151.  15 U.S.C. § 15 (“[A]nd shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained”). 
 152.  Wiley Jr., supra note 70, at 789 n.287. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. MacKerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal 
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 720 (1985); see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 75, at 
137–38 (describing the theory of the internalization principle).  
 155.  City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(“[A]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms.”) 
 156.  Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 253–54 (1951) (Reed, J., 
dissenting) (“The public policy of the United States fosters the free-enterprise system of 
unfettered competition among producers and distributors of goods as the accepted method to put 
those goods into the hands of all consumers at the least expense.”). 
SACK_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  12:03 PM 
114 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
any state interest in regulation. The state could lobby Congress to 
codify antitrust immunity, in which case the whole nation, which would 
bear the costs and benefits of such a program, could decide if it was in 
its best interest through their elected Congressional representatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The Parker doctrine exists to ensure that states may regulate and 
impose anti-competitive restraints without fear of antitrust scrutiny. In 
this sense, it represents a reverse preemption where a state’s regulation 
preempts the federal interest in promoting competition. Beginning with 
the immunity of a raisin cartel in the 1940s, the doctrine has largely 
remained intact without many alterations to present day. However, the 
doctrine is not without problems. From an economic standpoint, it 
shields regulations that are not efficient and allows a small number of 
producers to accrue benefits at the cost of many consumers. Further, 
the doctrine also encourages inefficient results from a political 
standpoint. Not only do spillovers create incentives for political actors 
to off-load costs to citizens that cannot vote them out, but those who 
bear the costs have no other redress to resolve their issues. Even if 
consumers did have a method of redress, a free-rider problem prevents 
groups from effectively advocating for solutions. These problems have 
been noted by a number of scholars, and many solutions have been 
presented. 
This paper proposes that the Supreme Court adopt a balancing test 
to determine whether or not a restraint on trade ought to be entitled to 
Parker doctrine immunity. Courts should balance the necessity and 
efficacy of a state regulation against the severity of out-of-state 
spillovers and collective action problems that regulation creates. If a 
court determines that the benefits of such a regulation are not 
outweighed by the potential harms to out-of-state consumers and 
interstate commerce, the court should permit the regulation to stand. If 
a state regulation is not entitled to immunity, the state may still petition 
Congress to grant antitrust immunity to the conduct in question. This 
balancing test would still allow states to regulate issues that arise within 
their borders but would curtail their ability to impose excessive costs 
across the nation in pursuit of those efforts. In turn, this harmonizes the 
Parker doctrine with America’s unique federalist system, while also 
promoting economic and political efficiency. 
 
